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Abstract This paper explores the role of ideology in
attempts to influence public policy and in business represen-
tation in the EU–China solar panel anti-dumping dispute. It
exposes the dynamics of international activity by emerging-
economy multinationals, in this case from China, and their
interactions in a developed-country context (the EU). Theo-
retically, the study also sheds light on the recent notion of
‘liability of origin’, in addition to the traditional concept of
‘liability of foreignness’ explored in international business
research, in relation to firms’ market and political strategies
and their institutional embeddedness in home and host coun-
tries. Through a qualitative analysis of primary and secondary
materials and interview data with key protagonists, we pro-
vide a detailed evolution of the case, the key actors involved
and their positions, arguments and strategies. This illustrates
the complexities involved in the interaction between markets
and ideologies in the midst of debates regarding different
forms of subsidy regimes for renewable energy, free trade
versus protectionist tendencies by governments, and the
economic and sustainability objectives of firms and societies.
The case shows how relative newcomers to the EU market
responded to overcome a direct threat to their business and
became, with support from their home government, active
participants in the public debate through interactions with
local commercial partners and non-governmental organisa-
tions. Firms adopted relatively sophisticated strategies to
reduce their liabilities vis-a`-vis host-country institutions and
local stakeholders, including collective action, to increase
their legitimacy and reputation, and counter ideologically
based attacks. We also discuss implications and limitations.
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Abbreviations
AFASE Alliance for Affordable Solar Energy—
grouping of companies against duties
EPIA European Photovoltaic Industry
Association—official EU level trade
association
EMNE Emerging-market multinational enterprise
EU ProSun Grouping of companies who supported
duties
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
LOF Liability of foreignness




SETI Sustainable Energy Trade Initiative—an
alliance of NGOs, companies and
governments supportive of efforts to
liberalise trade in environmental goods
Introduction
In the recent years, there has been considerable controversy
regarding imports of Chinese solar panels into the US and,
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surrounding the alleged dumping of these low-cost panels
are rather technical and in the realm of trade law and
industrial engineering (Carbaugh and St. Brown 2012;
Curran 2015; Erixon 2014; Van de Graaf 2013), the matter
also raises broader questions concerning the mobilisation
of ideologies in markets and international business. Con-
sidered in terms of the patterns or framework of ideas, as
ideologies are conceptualised in the call for papers for this
special issue, the dispute around Chinese solar panels is
somewhat puzzling in that different perspectives have been
taken on what can also be framed as an ethical issue. In the
context of global concerns about climate change, renew-
able energies, including solar, have been embraced for their
potential contribution to a lower-carbon economy. While
concerted action and the implementation of international
agreements have been difficult, the preservation of the
planet and the consequent need to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions might be considered an international moral norm
for business (Bowie 1997; Tully 2005). Perhaps it has even
become a ‘market morality’ (Bowie and Vaaler 1999),
given corporate recognition of the sustainability principle
as both a requirement for international business and a
potential source of competitive advantage (Kolk and
Pinkse 2008).
With affordability for broad sections of the population
as an additional consideration, government support has
become quite common in this sector by way of subsidies
and incentives for producers and/or buyers, sometimes as
part of wider stimulus plans (Haley and Schuler 2011).
Examples include the green bailout efforts following the
financial crisis in several countries and longer-standing
feed-in tariffs in Germany and several other EU countries
(for an overview, see Lewis 2014; cf. EPIA 2012; Pinkse
and Kolk 2012). This latter type of stimulation has resulted
in a much quicker adoption and installation of solar panels
in these countries than would otherwise have been the case
(Quitzow 2015). Against this background, the strong
objections to the widespread availability of relatively low-
cost panels from China on foreign markets seem somewhat
surprising. That these were developed and subsequently
offered cheaply abroad by Chinese companies thanks to
support from their home government, under-cutting the
European or the US producers, apparently superseded
environmental and affordability considerations (Carbaugh
and St. Brown 2012; Dunford et al. 2013; Lewis 2014).
Although various concrete economic arguments were
marshalled by proponents of anti-dumping measures and
other forms of trade defence, including references to pre-
sumed job losses (ProSun 2013a), often ideological factors
also seemed to be at play.
This paper analyses the role of ideology in attempts to
influence public policy and in business representation in
the EU solar panel anti-dumping dispute, using a case-
study approach. In addition to providing more insight into
the interaction between markets and ideologies, it exami-
nes the dynamics of international activity by emerging-
market multinational companies, in this case from China,
in developed-country markets (the EU). The analysis
contributes to international business theories, shedding
light on the recent notion of ‘liability of origin’ that has
emerged to complement the more traditional ‘liability of
foreignness’ faced by multinationals operating abroad
(Pinkse and Kolk 2012; Ramachandran and Pant 2010;
Stevens and Shenkar 2012). While dimensions of the lia-
bility of origin have been identified conceptually, empirical
exploration has hitherto been lacking, as discussed in the
next section. The overview of the most relevant literature is
followed by an explanation of the research approach and
background of the case. We subsequently present and
discuss the findings. The final section concludes and con-
siders implications and limitations.
Complexities of Doing Business in Foreign
Markets
The difficulties of accessing and/or operating in foreign
markets have long concerned scholars in international
business and management, reflecting the practical experi-
ences of firms over the years. Whether labelled ‘the cost of
doing business abroad’ or, subsequently, the ‘liability of
foreignness’ (LOF) (e.g. Zaheer 1995), what the different
concepts share is the focus on the problems faced by
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in their activities outside
their home country (Sethi and Judge 2009). As aptly
summarised by Denk et al. (2012), this body of literature
has yielded useful insights concerning, inter alia, the
impact of LOF on firms and their performance, and the
categorisation of the costs of doing business abroad into
different categories (e.g. Eden and Miller 2004; Zaheer
2002). Much work has focused on identifying and espe-
cially quantifying how LOF impacts firms, often using
large datasets (Mezias 2002; Miller and Eden 2006; Zaheer
1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997). In terms of cate-
gorisation, Eden and Miller (2004) differentiated between
LOF linked to unfamiliarity, discrimination and relational
hazards. The case we explore here is very much a dis-
criminatory hazard, i.e. one which emerges from differ-
ential government treatment and/or customer
ethnocentricity, aspects typically difficult to assess through
survey or database research.
In the existing literature, certain aspects have remained
underexplored. First, LOF research has thus far concen-
trated on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by developed-
country MNEs. Despite their growing importance, there
has been little work on emerging-economy MNEs
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(abbreviated as EMNEs or sometimes EE MNEs), which
often still focus on the so-called market-seeking invest-
ments. As this type of FDI activity is directly linked to
trade (and thus to possible discrimination against foreign
products) by newcomers on established markets, it is a
subset that seems particularly vulnerable to LOF (Guar
et al. 2011). Second, studies have paid only limited atten-
tion to approaches adopted by firms to mitigate their LOF,
especially in relation to difficulties with foreign institu-
tional contexts. This calls for a more explicit consideration
of the difference in firms’ home-country settings, as cap-
tured by the recently introduced notion of ‘liability of
origin’ (LOR). LOR relates to discrimination against firms
‘‘by host country consumers and governments because of
where they are from (i.e., their specific country of origin)’’,
as opposed to LOF’s focus on ‘‘where they are not from’’
(Ramachandran and Pant 2010, p. 243; emphases in
original).
In a conceptual piece, Ramachandran and Pant (2010)
note that LOR can best be understood by studying EMNEs
entering developed-country markets. Building on earlier
findings, particularly from international marketing, on con-
sumer animosity and negative product-country images
directed against a specific country, they formulate the
expectation that ‘‘a farmore significant role in the LORof EE
MNEs in developed-country markets would be played by
negative perceptions, stereotypes, or beliefs regarding pro-
duct or service quality associated with their country of ori-
gin’’ (Ramachandran and Pant 2010, p. 244). They also refer
to the ideological and strategic dimensions of (foreign)
governments’ discrimination of an MNE from a particular
country. This may stem from ‘‘friction caused by the attri-
butes of its home country institutions’’ (Stevens and Shenkar
2012, p. 133) including the economic policies or the political
stance of its government (Pinkse and Kolk 2012).
In recent years, several authors have underlined that
EMNEs are specifically confronted with these complexities
in their expansion into developed-countrymarkets in view of
what have been called institutional or ‘stakeholder-man-
dated’ differences (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008;
Kolk 2010a; McGuire et al. 2012; Verbeke 2009). As
emerging economies are characterised by ‘underdeveloped
institutions’ (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc 2008), or a combi-
nation of less active non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and lower or largely absent societal pressures and
concomitant strict(er) CSR requirements (Kolk 2010a),
EMNEs have more limited experience of addressing such
concerns. The distance between home and host settings has
been particularly pronounced in the case of China. Chinese
firms consequently face high institutional costs when oper-
ating inWestern contexts, including those related to negative
stereotyping about Chinese products and company gover-
nance (Eden andMiller 2009). Often ‘regular’ disadvantages
related to trade and exports that compete with (domestic)
developed-country producers on their home market have
been exacerbated by political, economic and CSR/sustain-
ability considerations (Pinkse andKolk 2012). This has gone
beyond the ‘‘ethics away from home’’ tensions (as Donald-
son 1996, put it) faced byMNEs in general, and discussed in
the international business literature (e.g. Bowie 1997; Bowie
and Vaaler 1999; Kolk 2015).
The EU–China solar panel dispute that we explore in this
paper provides a clear example of the complexities involved
in foreign markets and the role of ideologies, particularly
those related to country of origin. The dispute resides within
controversies surrounding climate change policy, domestic
subsidy regimes for production and/or consumption of
renewables, and extends to other (non-CSR) trading topics,
including local-content clauses, institutional embeddedness
and firms’ market and political strategies (Haley and Schuler
2011; Pinkse and Kolk 2012).WhileMNE responses to LOF
have received some attention, most studies have explored
contexts of ‘deep presence’ resulting from investments in
local production or service provision. Examples of such firm
strategies include adjusting human resource policies to bal-
ance expat and local management, providing more inde-
pendence to subsidiaries in certain areas and, most relevant
for EMNEs, reducing unfamiliarity through learning and
exchange, adapting to local circumstances through com-
munity contributions and seeking to become an ‘insider’
(Daamen et al. 2007; Eden and Miller 2009; Klossek et al.
2012; Mezias 2002). While the solar case involves a pri-
marily trade-related, more ‘shallow’ presence, MNE
responses are expected to at least partly resonate with those
found in the literature.
The question of how to overcome the additional liability
related to the country of origin has mainly been explored
conceptually, both in general (Moeller et al. 2013) and
specifically for EMNEs (Ramachandran and Pant 2010). In
addition to actions at the subsidiary level, crucial for
addressing LOF, LOR requires initiatives at the corporate
level and by government agencies from the firm’s home
country, preferably simultaneously (McGuire et al. 2012),
to help diminish adverse institutional attributions. Fur-
thermore, to increase legitimacy in host countries,
Ramachandran and Pant (2010) point to the possible role of
institutional entrepreneurship in mobilising sufficient
resources and other types of support to change perceptions.
This can include collective action via industry associations
that target governments and other key stakeholders as well
as spreading best practices amongst members (Ra-
machandran and Pant 2010). Building good relationships in
the host country at different levels, both individually and
collectively, may promote the organisational identity of the
firm and improve its reputation and corporate image. While
our exploratory study is not intended to address all of these
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dimensions, it will expose some of the complexities, as
explained in the research approach section.
The Role of Ideology
Ideology has been analysed in several different streams of
social science but it nevertheless remains a ‘‘nebulous and
slippery concept’’ (Fine and Sandstrom 1993, p. 22), sub-
ject to wide variations in definition and application. The
most useful of the various definitions in the literature for
our purposes is that of Denzau and North (1994, p. 4) who
define ideologies as ‘‘the shared framework of mental
models that groups of individuals possess that provide both
an interpretation of the environment and a prescription of
how that environment should be structured’’. Thus, ide-
ologies are by nature normative, as they relate not just to
our understanding of how things are but also to how things
ought to be. As Fine and Sandstrom (1993) highlight,
ideologies thus become particularly salient in relation to
solving problems in the socio-political world.
In relation to the issue of how ideology influences
business at the micro-level, researchers have explored how
individuals’ ideological beliefs impact their choices,
including key issues of business ethics (Barnett et al. 1994;
Bass et al. 1999). Nevertheless, there is also clearly the
potential for ideological differences to affect international
business activity, as the solutions to socio-political prob-
lems will vary across countries given that ‘shared mental
models’ (Denzau and North 1994) are culturally grounded
and often location based. Research on the role of ideology
in the international business context mostly entails large-
scale quantitative work focusing on how political ideolo-
gies (usually of the right–left typology) impact economic
outcomes such as the degree of state ownership (Avsar
et al. 2013) or environmental protection (Garmann 2014).
What interests us here, however, is how ideologies and the
‘stories’ which are integral parts of their transmission (Wines
andHamilton 2009) can be harnessed by certain groupswithin
a society in a manner that serves their interests. We therefore
explore ideology as a tool, strongly linked to rhetoric ‘‘to
enhance public impression (and to justify the claims and
resources) of presenters and/or adherents’’ (Fine and Sand-
strom 1993, p. 35). As Chelli and Gendron (2013, p. 190)
underline, identifying such strategies involves analysing the
discourse of the actors as they seek to convince the audienceof
‘‘the validity or even obviousness of some ideas’’. Such an
analysis was undertaken by Haase and Raufflet (2012)
regarding the transformation of Canadian oil sands from
‘dirty’ to ‘ethical’. Here ideology turned out to have been
clearly harnessed to present OPEC producers as ‘‘unethical,
unsecure and unreliable’’ (Haase and Raufflet 2012, p. 479),
largely on the basis of their non-democratic governance, and
the need to uphold ‘ethics’ was successfully argued to trump
environmental concerns. There are similarities with the solar
case examined in this article, as will be explained below.
Given that differences in governance systems provide the
potential for conflicting ideological visions, it is not sur-
prising that China’s emergence as an economic power has
led to controversy. Halper (2011, p. 18) argues that China‘‘
advances diplomatic, political, and economic values anti-
thetical to those that have informed the status quo global
architecture’’. The same author considers the capacity of
China to export its ‘market-authoritarian’ model a threat to
Western values (Halper 2010). Shortgen (2009) identifies
such rhetoric as the ‘China Threat’ school, firmly rooted in
perceptions of ideological difference, with Scott and
Wilkinson (2013) arguing that this school of thought
increasingly infuses attitudes to China. The potential for
these perceptions to affect Chinese business expansion has
been underlined by several authors, who highlight that
concerns about the role of the state and stereotypes about low
quality goods and questionable labour practices have the
potential to create substantial LOF, or rather LOR, for Chi-
nese firms abroad (Eden and Miller 2009; McGuire et al.
2012). Despite these statements, however, we find no sub-
stantial analysis in the literature of the interactions between
such perceived ideological differences and LOF/LOR.
Given the increasing number of globally active Chinese
MNEs, this question merits further consideration.
On the specific issue of Chinese MNEs involvement in
the solar sector, several recent articles have helped to shed
light on their role in the global solar photovoltaic (PV)
industry and/or related (detailed legal) trade issues between
China and the US, and less often, between China and
Europe (Carbaugh and St Brown 2012; Clark 2013; Curran
2015; Haley and Schuler 2011; Lewis 2014). They have
highlighted the complex international production and sup-
ply networks, the rapid growth of late entrant and low-cost
producer China, and the resulting overcapacity on the
global market (Dunford et al. 2013; Gallagher and Zhang
2013). However, scholars have provided a generic over-
view of the actors and paid only very limited attention to
the (collective) activities of Chinese and domestic firms,
and their interactions with governments and other stake-
holders as these cases evolved. This also means that the
role of ideology in attempts to influence public policy and
in business representation has remained unexplored. We
seek to highlight this aspect of the debate.
Research Approach
Our paper follows a qualitative, case study approach to
provide a deeper understanding of the context and the
actors in relation to the issues at stake. In this way, it
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responds to calls by scholars that have provided overviews
of both the EMNE and LOF literatures (respectively Jor-
manainen and Koveshnikov 2012; Luo and Mezias 2002)
for more in-depth exploration. Furthermore, on the specific
issue of increasing insight into EMNEs’ LOR,
Ramachandran and Pant (2010, p. 257) explicitly recom-
mend ‘‘a temporary privileging of case studies over vari-
ance studies’’. The import of Chinese solar panels into the
EU is a very pertinent case through which to explore the
complexities highlighted in the previous sections, as it
encompasses a country of origin where there is clear sup-
port for production (China) and a destination (foreign
context) with widespread incentives for the consumer
uptake (most notably in Germany but also other European
countries) (Quitzow 2015; Zhang et al. 2013).
Hence, when placed in the two-by-two matrix of Haley
and Schuler (2011), which distinguished government
assistance to the solar photovoltaic industry for production
and/or consumption, our empirical case covers countries
with diametrically opposing approaches and different ide-
ological approaches to the role of the state. China provides
consistent state support to industry, which increases the
tendency of Chinese firms to produce and subsequently
export excess capacity, especially to countries that promote
consumption (Quitzow 2015; Zhang et al. 2013). This sit-
uation is likely to culminate in confrontation, in this case in
the EU, between domestic producers and foreign exporters.
We extend the work by Haley and Schuler (2011), who
provided a very helpful but more generic overview of
government policy and firm strategy, considering firms’
non-market actions in their local, domestic context, but
who also acknowledged that they had ignored other rele-
vant dimensions. Our study includes broader interactions,
within an international setting and joint action via business
associations.
It is important to note that the solar case is part of a
wider trend towards increased trade tensions with regard to
renewables and sustainability, which has affected not just
solar, but also wind and biofuels (Carbaugh and St Brown
2012; Lewis 2014). These are linked to a fundamental
disconnect between international rules founded on free and
fair trade, on the one hand, and active government support
for low-carbon energy, which by nature tends to distort
markets, on the other (Carbaugh and St Brown 2012; Lewis
2014). This dissonance has given rise to legal analysis and
calls for reform of the World Trade Organisation’s subsidy
rules to better reflect the reality of the situation and provide
more ‘policy space’ for governments to support industry in
order to achieve renewable energy targets (Rubini 2011). In
the meantime, however, judgements on what is and what is
not acceptable continue to vary nationally, leading to legal
conflicts where jurisprudence is complex and somewhat
contradictory (Mavroidis 2013).
We examined the EU–China solar panel anti-dumping
dispute in detail as it unfolded from the summer of 2012
until the establishment of the minimum price undertaking a
year later, and traced it subsequently, with the latest check
in December 2014. It should be noted that the case is not
fully concluded as efforts continue to restrict imports and
review the final agreement (ProSun 2015). A timeline of
the case has been constructed to provide insight into key
developments and actors. Two ad-hoc groups were set up
to lobby for and against anti-dumping duties, respectively
EU ProSun, which also launched the case, and AFASE, the
Alliance for Affordable Solar Energy. Both organisations
and their websites were monitored throughout the case, and
their position papers, press releases, advice for members
and copies of commissioned reports analysed. We also
examined the international press, particularly the Financial
Times, The Economist and European Voice, and their
regular reports on the progress of the case. Given the
confidential nature of EU anti-dumping investigations,
previous research has used the press as a reliable source in
comparable situations (Evenett and Vermulst 2005), and
for business–government interactions more generally (e.g.
Pinkse et al. 2014). Finally, and despite limitations due to
the (legal) sensitivity of the case, especially for regulatory
bodies, we managed to conduct skype and face-to-face
interviews with several key actors over the period of the
proceedings and afterwards, which enabled a proper cross-
check.1
In addition to assessing the evolution of the case, the key
actors and their positions in general, we specifically anal-
ysed all of the information collected in relation to the
important dimensions identified in the literature, discussed
in the previous section. First, the arguments used by pro-
ponents and opponents were examined on their merits to
trace ideological and strategic components. As specified in
the next section, the economic and political importance of
the solar panel case means that a mix of factors has been
involved, often used in an interrelated way. Arguments
include job losses and employment, climate change and
sustainability concerns, cost and affordability of solar,
product quality and issues of government support and the
related ‘China threat’. Second, the solar panel case was
used as a lens to view how the Chinese MNEs responded.
We sought to identify their strategies and tactics, including
collective action, to increase their legitimacy and reputa-
tion, and reduce their LOF, and particularly LOR, in
1 We were able to interview informants on both sides of the case,
including several people that were actively involved in AFASE and
ProSun, in addition to market analysts of the European Photovoltaic
Industry Association and a representative of the Sustainable Energy
Trade Initiative. The seven interviews were spread over 2013 and
2014 (three in January 2013, one in August 2013, one in November
2013, one in May 2014 and one in October 2014).
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relation to host-country institutions and local stakeholders
in the EU.
Findings
This section will first give an overview of key develop-
ments and actors in the EU–China solar case, followed by
the arguments that have been used, often involving a mix
of factors, and a discussion of MNE response strategies to
LOF and particularly to LOR.
Key Developments and Actors in the Case
The solar panel anti-dumping case unfolded against a
background of very rapid increases in Chinese production
capacity and an exponential growth of solar panel exports
from China, which went from practically nothing in 2003
to over 40 % of the world export market in 2009. By 2010,
three of the top five global PV companies were Chinese
(Algieri et al. 2011). This growth, based on a combination
of low costs and vertical integration, also contributed to a
50 % fall in prices between 2010 and 2011. These devel-
opments inevitably put pressure on market actors and on
both sides of the Atlantic (Dunford et al. 2013), but the EU
was the key global market for solar panels, with 75 % of
the total installed capacity in 2011 (EPIA 2012). In this
context of rapid growth in market share, falling prices and
home-government support, trade tensions were not sur-
prising (Haley and Haley 2013).
The exact situation on the EU market is difficult to
assess with certainty from public data, as calculating
market shares and prices often require proprietary infor-
mation. This provided the opportunity for both sides to
mobilise data that reflected their ideological points of view.
Thus, the two protagonists—AFASE and ProSun—pre-
sented very different perceptions of the market situation
and, especially, of the reasons for market difficulties.
Table 1 provides an overview of the situation in as much as
it can be gauged from public data and other sources,
together with the claims of both sides. It is commonly
accepted that the market share of Chinese firms was high
and growing, although academic analysis indicates that this
was, at least in part, due to a historical lack of capacity
within the EU in the face of rising market demand (Quit-
zow 2015). Where the two sides differ fundamentally, as
explored below, is in their conclusions on the reasons for
this rapid increase in market share.
As further background for the case, Table 2 presents the
timeline of the EU solar anti-dumping (AD) dispute, with
US developments for information. Given the focus of this
paper, and in view of existing published work mentioned
above, we do not go into specific legal details but will
discuss relevant aspects where needed. As the overview
shows, the key events of the European case were basically
concentrated in one year. Interestingly, two German com-
panies (SolarWorld and Conergy) had apparently already
tried to instigate an investigation in the EU in August 2009
(Lewis 2014). While unsuccessful, this attempt illustrated
rising attention to the issue in the course of a few years.
Table 1 EU market situation according to official figures, to ProSun and to AFASE
Market
characteristic
Official figures According to ProSun According to AFASE
Market share Trade figures (from the ITC Trademap
database) indicate that Chinese imports
represented 44 % of EU imports by $
value (including internal EU trade) in
2011
Claimed that Chinese companies had
80 % EU market share in 2011 (ProSun
2012a)
Indicated, in a press interview, that
Chinese market share was 57 %.
Claimed that this was mainly due to
lack of supply capacity in the EU
(Choudhury 2013)
Price falls Trade figures indicate that Chinese $
prices per ton fell by 48 % between
June 2011 to August 2012. Unit prices
from all sources fell by 42 %. Chinese
prices remained 20 % below the
average import price.
Claimed that price falls were due to
dumping, enabled by low cost loans,
export support and direct government
support to failing companies (ProSun
2013a)
Claimed that price falls were an
inevitable result of economies of scale,
but also related to major falls in price
of polysilicon. EU companies were
locked into long-term contracts above
the market price, increasing their costs,
and many were small (AFASE 2012a)
Bankruptcies No official figures. In March 2013, the
specialist press reported that over a
dozen German solar companies had
gone bankrupt in the previous
12 months (Blau 2013)
Provided a long list of companies that
went bankrupt/left the solar industry on
website (ProSun 2013b). When last
updated, in October 2013, it included
over 70 companies, including
Gehrlicher
Claimed that EU companies had adopted
inappropriate strategies. Pointed out
that 35–40 % of Chinese companies
had also gone bankrupt (AFASE
2013a). Claimed that Gehrlicher’s
bankruptcy was due to AD duties
(AFASE 2013b), although ProSun
argued that dumping had caused it
(ProSun 2013c)
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Following a complaint from ProSun, the AD investigation
was formally launched by the European Commission in
September 2012. It was acknowledged to be the most
significant anti-dumping investigation to date, with Chi-
nese PV panel exports to the EU amounting to around 8 %
of overall Chinese exports to the EU at that time (CEC
2012a). While the analysis was not made public, as is
common in AD cases, interim duties were first imposed in
June 2013 (CEC 2013).
Member states were divided on the issue, however: a
majority of 18 of the 28 reportedly opposed these duties
(De Gruyter 2014), including most notably Germany,
which had been against the investigation throughout
(Curran 2015; Oliver 2014; Yu 2013). This discord com-
plicated a final imposition of duties and created the con-
ditions for a very intense and more ideologically charged
debate. In contrast to the US, where anti-dumping duties
were imposed, the final agreement reached in the EU was
for a so-called ‘minimum price undertaking’, which
resulted in a price floor and a limit on market share—a
decision supported by 22 member states (AFASE 2013c),
but heavily criticised by ProSun. While the outcome
reduced the flexibility for Chinese firms, the strong con-
testation and appeal by ProSun revealed its perception of
who had ‘won’ and who had ‘lost’ the case. Following the
July 2013 agreement, it submitted a formal appeal to the
European Court and continues to monitor developments,
resulting in the presentation of evidence of alleged
infringement of minimum prices to the Commission as well
as a request for an anti-circumvention investigation into
alleged transhipment via Taiwan and Malaysia (ProSun
2015; SETI 2015).
The solar case thus became highly politicised, a con-
testation involving governments, business and their asso-
ciations, although it did not really become a serious issue
for public debate or for consumers. Even before any con-
clusions were reached, the Chinese government reacted
strongly to the investigation and instigated parallel anti-
dumping cases against the EU (especially regarding
polysilicon, just after the launch of the case and wine, after
the initial conclusions), thus implicating other companies,
sectors and related countries. This move illustrates the
tendency, confirmed in empirical studies, for many AD
cases to be instigated in retaliation (Feinberg and Reynolds
2006; Prusa and Skeath 2001), with the consequence that
fear of retaliation is an important factor in EU member
states’ voting decisions (Nordstro¨m 2011).
A legal peculiarity relevant to this specific case (and to
the ideological nature of some of the arguments) is that the
EU and the US treat China as a so-called non-market
economy (NME) for anti-dumping investigations. Even
though the protocol of China’s accession to the World
Trade Organisation enables market-economy status
(applied by many other countries), the EU does not yet
consider China to have fulfilled the requirements (CEC
2012b; EP 2012). This classification matters to China.
Being cast as an NME is seen as a hindrance to the
country’s global economic ambitions and the government
vehemently advocates change (Halper 2010; Ding 2011;
Yu 2013). Moreover, as firms from an NME can more
easily be targeted in AD investigations, Chinese MNEs are
disadvantaged, casting a shadow over their capacity to
develop global markets (Hou and Ren 2006).
China is the country targeted most often in EU anti-
dumping procedures: of the 117 EU AD measures in force
at the end of 2011, 53 involved China (next most affected
were India and Thailand with 7 each; CEC 2012b). Chinese
scholars have highlighted the ideological underpinnings of
the NME status, which they consider a ‘political tool’, even
questioning whether AD investigations can be objective in
democracies. ‘‘In the multi-party, election-based democ-
racies, politicians normally pay too much attention to the
voice of unions and lobby groups… However, consumers’
loss is ignored in the system…’’ (Hou and Ren 2006,
p. 79). Thus, on both sides, the status of Chinese MNEs in
AD seems underpinned by ideological differences.
Although such divergence between home and host attitudes
is of course not a new challenge for Chinese MNEs (Kolk
2010b), the stakes are particularly high in AD
investigations.
In terms of the actors, SolarWorld played a prominent
role in the EU and in the US in the respective ad-hoc
industry groups that filed complaints on dumping; in both
regions, counter-alliances were also created to lobby
against the duties. As mentioned in the previous section,
EU ProSun launched the case in the EU, with AFASE as
the opponent; these two coalitions, established in 2012
even before the investigation started, were the key business
actors.2 The European Photovoltaic Industry Association
(EPIA) chose to remain neutral, as did intermediary pro-
ducers that supplied firms on both sides of the divide.
While AFASE has been relatively open about its mem-
bership (see below), ProSun deliberately refrained from
disclosing details. Its website contains a ‘‘statement on
anonymous supporters’’ that clearly reveals the overall
positioning: ‘‘Unfortunately companies who take a public
stance against China are sometimes targeted by the
authorities there. As EU Trade Commissioner Karel de
Gucht recently stated, ‘It is undeniable that many Euro-
pean companies are unwilling to come forward and make
justified trade defence complaints due to fear of conse-
quences for their business’. Hence the European
2 In the US, the Coalition for Solar Manufacturing filed the
complaint, and the Coalition for Affordable Solar Energy lobbied
against the duties.
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Commission accepts confidentiality in filing trade com-
plaints, and most of EU ProSun supporters wish to stay
anonymous.’’3 Although impossible to verify, SolarWorld
(2012) claimed that the majority of the industry backed the
complaint. Interview data indicate that ProSun supporters
generally had limited links to the Chinese market. This was
also said to apply, most notably, to SolarWorld itself.
AFASE maintained a full list of supporters and their
country of origin on its website. It was dissolved as a
separate entity on 31 October 2013 and integrated into
SETI (the Sustainable Energy Trade Initiative Alliance, an
industry coalition initiated and hosted by the International
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, ICTSD, in
Geneva). AFASE consistently mentioned the number of
supporters, with 850 as the final count, to characterise itself
as ‘‘a coalition of over 850 companies in the European
Photovoltaic (PV) industry. We work to prevent protec-
tionism in the sector and promote the benefits of free trade
for solar energy products’’.4 This formulation does not
imply that all companies were ‘European’ in terms of head
office; several were not. Nine Chinese companies were
listed on AFASE’s website in November 2012, including
most notably Trina Solar and Yingli (the two largest solar
PV firms worldwide at this point). Non-EU members
accounted for 23 % of the total then, including not only
Table 2 Timeline of the EU solar anti-dumping investigation (with US developments as reference information)
Date EU key events US key events
October 2011 Coalition of US solar panel makers, led by SolarWorld, file
anti-dumping case against Chinese solar cells and panels
with the US Department of Commerce
November 2011 US investigation launched
May 2012 Preliminary findings of dumping margins of between
31.14–249.96 %
July 2012 EU ProSun (also led by SolarWorld) files a complaint to the
European Commission against Chinese exports of solar
wafers, cells and panels
September 2012 European Commission initiates EU investigation
October 2012 Definitive duties of 18.32–249.96 % imposed
June 2013 Provisional duties of 11.8 % imposed until August 2013. In
case an agreement would be lacking by then, duties to be
increased to 47.6 %
July 2013 Agreement announced between Commission and the key





December 2013 SolarWorld files new case against exports of certain Solar
cells and panels from China and Taiwan with US
Department of Commerce
January 2014 Second investigation launched
July 2014 ProSun indicates that it has submitted over 1500 proposals
by Chinese solar companies offering prices below
minimum level agreed by EU and Chinaa
Preliminary findings of dumping margins of between
26.33–165.04 %
a According to ProSun (2014a): ‘‘The European Commission has said it is investigating this claim, but nothing has been done yet against these
illegal practices’’. In May 2015, however, the Commission proposed to withdraw three Chinese companies from the undertaking, making them
subject to AD duties (SETI 2015). ProSun’s court challenge against the agreement is still under way, although it is unlikely that there will be an
outcome before the end of 2015 (SETI 2014)
3 http://www.prosun.org/en/about/mission.html (last consulted 9
December 2014); emphasis in original. Interestingly, the quote in
italics is derived from a speech of the then trade commissioner,
related by Chaffin (2012) and Evans (2012) to a possible EU inves-
tigation into alleged dumping by the Chinese telecoms companies
Huawei and ZTE. Had it been launched, this would have been the first
case pursued by the Commission in the absence of a formal complaint
by business actors. Although referring to a different situation and
another sector, ProSun nevertheless used it to support its own posi-
tion. The telecoms case was never launched, partly because leading
EU companies were reported to ‘‘not want a trade war with China’’
(Oliver 2014), but it did affect the solar case as its threat influenced
the overall approach of the Chinese government. 4 http://afase.org/en/mission (last updated October 2013).
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Chinese companies but also six from the US and one each
formally from Canada and Pakistan (although the Canadian
firm appeared to have all of its manufacturing facilities in
China and the one from Pakistan seemed to be an American
company with an important Chinese partner). However, the
nationality and number of firms varied considerably over
time. As AFASE developed, most of the Chinese firms
dropped out. By March 2013, the two Chinese firms that
remained—Trina Solar and Yingli—were listed as Swiss.
Three months later, both had disappeared from the list of
members, even though Trina Solar (2013) continued to
make public statements against the duties. In June 2013,
only 3 % of AFASE members were non-EU firms,
although by then there were members from all 28 member
states.
All informants we spoke to concur that a key actor in
the inception of AFASE was Trina Solar, a private Chi-
nese company based in Changzhou, founded in 1997 and
listed on NYSE and Nasdaq in 2006. Trina Solar’s sales
have historically been strongly focused on the European
market, although its importance declined from 93 % in
2009 to 68 % in 2011, concurrent with an increasing
presence in the US, accounting for 22 % of sales in 2011
before the US AD case restricted market access (Trina
Solar 2012). Its total sales increased from $845 million to
$2048 million over the same period, although profits fell
from $96 million to a loss of $38 million in 2011. The
company attributed this to deteriorating market conditions,
including declining government support. Trina Solar has
an extensive network of sales offices and regional head-
quarters in Europe (Zurich), North America (San Jose)
and South East Asia (Singapore). When we first spoke to
Trina Solar’s representative in Brussels, the firm was
unambiguous about its important role in AFASE. Over
time, however, its involvement in the alliance dwindled
and finally ceased in June 2013. The Trina employee who
was the key spokesperson for AFASE for the first few
months of their operations was replaced in January 2013
by two European representatives of the public relations
consultancy G Plus.
Yingli Solar was the other key Chinese firm involved in
the case. Based in Baoding, Hebei Province, where most of
its manufacturing takes place, it is also a private company,
quoted on the NYSE, although it has a joint venture in
China with Tianwei Baobian, a state-owned manufacturer
of large electricity transformers. Yingli was a member of
AFASE since its inception in summer 2012, until June
2013 when, like Trina, it withdrew from the alliance.
Although was not as active as Trina, the company noted the
importance of the issue, for example in the annual report
(Yingli 2015, p. 11): ‘‘While we were exempted from
paying any antidumping and anti-subsidy duties to the EU
starting from August 6, 2013, increased sale prices and
reduced consumption in the European market under the
Undertaking may bring significant uncertainties to our
business in the European market’’.
How many external resources were mobilised by
AFASE itself to develop and implement its strategy and
how many of those resources came from Chinese firms has
been impossible to establish. Throughout 2014, neither
AFASE, nor the European companies directly involved in
the board, or AFASE’s official PR company—G Plus—
declared their lobbying activity on the solar panel case
under the EU’s transparency register of lobbyists. In mid-
November 2014, G Plus finally provided details of its
clientele for 2013, which included the AFASE members
Trina, Yingli and Suntech from China, as well as Canadian
Solar and the British installer Solar Century. All were
indicated as clients representing a turnover of less than
€50,000. Trina Solar also registered individually and
indicated that that they spent €50–100,000 annually, a
figure that seems rather low given the level of their activity
in Brussels when the case was being debated. Kreab Gavin
Anderson, another PR company in Brussels, listed Trina
Solar as a client, but indicated that spending on their ser-
vices was under €50,000 (CEC 2014). In the later months
of the campaign, the firm disappeared from the public
lobbying radar. Press releases quoted mainly the CEOs of
the three board members of AFASE, who are Dutch or
German (e.g. AFASE 2013b).
Arguments Used in the Case: Exploring Ideologies
The preceding overview of key developments and actors
has already provided the background to some of the most
prominent arguments used in this highly contested case.
This section will explore these in more detail and also
highlight their ideological nature where applicable. In the
solar panel case, arguments focused on job losses and
employment numbers, the importance of renewables in the
context of sustainability, cost and affordability of solar, and
the issue of government support. Table 3 contains some
illustrative quotes and views from both AFASE and Pro-
Sun, including assertions of a more ideological nature on
the various aspects.
In terms of the more ideologically charged arguments,
the ProSun statement quoted above referring to company
confidentiality and fear of retaliation explicitly mentioned
the role of China, i.e. its government. This framing of
Chinese companies as inseparable from the Chinese state
pervaded the arguments used by ProSun (and by Solar-
World). Sometimes it was left (largely) implicit, for
example when emphasising the loss of European jobs, of
the EU’s technological and market position in solar, and of
its long-term energy security. Frequently, however, these
aspects were linked to China ‘taking over’ the sector, a
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policy instigated directly by its government, or indirectly
through Chinese firms (with AFASE as ‘front organisa-
tion’), and the need for the EU to draw a line in this case to
signal action against the more generic ‘China threat’
beyond the solar sector. As ProSun (2013d) put it, ‘‘From
steel production to the automobile industry, no one can be
certain to be able to obtain redress against even the most
flagrantly illegal subsidised dumping by producers from
third countries. For Europe’s industrial base, this would be
devastating’’. In a sense, ProSun’s argument was helped by
the legal status of China as an NME, given the country’s
persistent failure to qualify as a market economy, reflecting
a wider difficulty in acceptance of the Chinese economic
model abroad (Halper 2010), as also noted in an EU report
‘‘…there is no denying that some of China’s industrial and
macro-economic policies imply an approach based on state
capitalism.’’ (CEC 2010, p. 5).
Chinese firms in the dispute sought to distance them-
selves from the state apparatus and underlined their private
status, insisting that they were competing in the EU on a
level-playing field, as part of an industry that is global in
nature, with firms from a range of nationalities spread over
the whole supply chain. Nevertheless, the fact that their
home country is labelled an NME means that they are
inevitably disadvantaged, both in arguing their case and
concretely in the manner in which AD investigations are
conducted (Hou and Ren 2006; Liu 2005). This also
enabled ProSun to cast them as representative of a different
type of competition. As a spokesperson mentioned during
an interview in August 2013, ‘‘European companies are not
afraid of competing with Korean or Japanese or Americans
or whoever, but they can’t compete with China, because
China has this incredible state support’’. Thus, ProSun
clearly presented the priorities of the Chinese government
and of its exporting firms as one and the same (referring to
AFASE as a ‘‘Chinese lobby group’’ (ProSun 2013c).
AFASE obviously felt the need to respond to these charges.
Indications of this include its evolving membership,
examined above, in terms of nationalities and dwindling
involvement of Chinese firms, and its disbandment and
integration into the well-respected SETI (see next subsec-
tion). ProSun (2013a) cast an ever wider net, however, in
the firms they targeted, implying that all those involved in
AFASE were suspect, ‘‘Chinese solar manufacturers are
backing a European front group of installers who use their
products called AFASE’’.
ProSun’s statements became most ferocious and ideo-
logically oriented after the minimum price undertaking was
concluded in July 2013, with attacks on Chinese producers
and others involved in the trade in solar panels (labelled
‘‘shady middlemen’’) and even on the EU authorities.
Examples include the accusation that ‘‘Chinese solar
manufacturers, illegal [sic] subsidised and state financed,
sell their products in Europe far below production costs’’
and ‘‘Chinese manufacturers never cease to trick, deceive
and circumvent their own undertaking and EU rules’’
(ProSun 2013d, 2014a). The EU authorities were portrayed
as passive bystanders at best and, at worst, as extremely
weak and complicit in undermining the industry. Accord-
ing to ProSun (2013d): ‘‘Throughout the negotiations,
China appears to have blackmailed and mocked the EU’’.
This unequal relationship apparently continued into the
administration of the minimum price undertaking. When
the Chinese government requested a revision to the mini-
mum price to reflect currency evolution, ProSun stated
(2014b) that ‘‘Beijing gave Brussels ‘an offer they could
not refuse’ increasing injury to European industry and
neutering EU trade defence measures’’. This was presented
as ‘‘currency trickery’’ and heavily criticised: ‘‘DG Trade
has already forwarded China’s proposal to other services
for rubber-stamp approval, and intends to gloss over it as a
technicality in a meeting with EU Member States’’ (ProSun
2014b).
There were also more economically grounded concerns
in Europe about the specific threat posed by the growth and
spread of EMNEs, a phenomenon discussed more generally
in relation to the established position of western firms on
their home markets (Kothari et al. 2013; Kumar et al.
2013). However, these also had an ideological dimension,
as the issue of ‘how’ support is garnered in different
countries has been fundamental to much of the debate in
this case. As noted above, the EU mostly focuses on sub-
sidisation of the uptake of renewable energy on the buyer
side, whereas government support in China has mainly
taken the form of support for production, as part of a
broader effort to move up the value chain to more inno-
vative manufacturing (Dunford et al. 2013; Grau et al.
2012; Haley and Haley 2013; Nahm and Steinfeld 2014;
Zhang et al. 2013). As such differential support systems
have divergent impacts in economic, political and envi-
ronmental terms, they paved the way for a debate on what
counts as ‘fair’ government support for realising societal
goals. As Haley and Haley (2013) point out, although most
economists regard trade protection as an inefficient and
distortive tool, some have argued that in cases of govern-
ment production subsidies and asymmetric market access
the reaction of MNEs to seek protection is perfectly
rational. There is thus some intellectual underpinning to the
ideological arguments for protection which emerge in this
case.
Interestingly, while the literature on LOR also refers to
the use of negative perceptions of the products/service
from a specific country (Ramachandran and Pant 2010),
this aspect was rarely highlighted in our case. ProSun
mentioned the lower quality of Chinese panels during an
interview, and could have used it for stereotyping and
A. Kolk, L. Curran
123
promoting fear and distrust. However, it did not really play
a role in the public discourse. Perhaps ProSun felt it had
insufficient evidence to come out with firm public state-
ments as many of those interviewed (including EPIA and
SETI) see solar panels as a mere commodity, with little
difference between products. Still, ProSun argues that they
differ from basic commodities on the grounds that, unlike
mobile phones, solar panels need to continue working for
over 20 years (ProSun 2013a).
There is, however, little objective evidence that Chinese
panels are sub-standard. Several in-depth studies of the
Chinese solar sector indicate that many firms have suc-
cessfully reached technological equivalence with Western
producers (Dunford et al. 2013; Nahm and Steinfeld 2014;
Quitzow 2015). In their analysis of the evolution of the key
Chinese solar companies, Dunford et al. (2013) describe
how Chinese industry—through a combination of imported
machinery, repatriated skilled scientists and acquisitions—
managed to develop capacities very rapidly. Quitzow
(2015) describes similar strategies, highlighting how Chi-
nese firms have benefitted from substantial technology
transfer from German solar panel producers and equipment
manufacturers. He argues that this technology transfer,
together with indigenous innovation, take-overs and
returnee scientists, have enabled the companies to over-
come initial customer distrust. Nahm and Steinfeld (2014)
similarly argue that Chinese firms have combined inter-
national technology with unique domestic capacity to
develop cutting-edge solar and wind capacities.
In addition to the more ideologically charged arguments
explored above, protagonists of the duties used traditional
economic arguments concerning the negative impacts of
low-price imports, a common strategy in dumping disputes
(see, for example, the analysis of the EU case against
Chinese and Vietnamese footwear in Eckhardt 2011). The
arguments used in the solar panel case differed little from
those in previous anti-dumping disputes, regardless of the
ideological underpinning of the country of origin. They
reflect the legal reality that, for anti-dumping duties to be
imposed there must be evidence, not only that dumping has
taken place, but also that it has caused ‘material injury’ to
local industry (CEC 2012a). In this context, the focus is not
on the nature of the competition, as in the ideological
arguments outlined above, but on the socio-economic
implications.
Thus, a very prominent argument used by ProSun
involved the negative economic impact of imports on the
EU solar panel industry, especially concerning job losses.
On its website, ProSun kept a list of EU companies that had
become insolvent or ceased solar production to help
establish the harm caused by Chinese dumping (Prosun
2013b). Interestingly this list also included companies that
had been taken over by Chinese investors. AFASE’s
generic response was to point to the fact that most solar
employment and value creation was in Europe if one
includes both upstream and downstream jobs in the EU PV
industry (polysilicon, ancillary inputs, machinery and the
installation sector). It also argued that EU production of
intermediate products for the solar sector was very
important and that instigating anti-dumping duties would
increase prices in the EU, thus reducing demand for both
the final product and these intermediate inputs, and creat-
ing a ‘boomerang’ effect in Europe (AFASE 2012b).
To provide further counter-evidence, AFASE commis-
sioned an external Swiss consultancy, Prognos, to examine
the economic implications. The resulting report stressed the
very negative effects of possible anti-dumping duties in
terms of both job losses and value creation in the EU (see
Table 3). Germany was expected to suffer the most
(Prognos 2013; cf. Curran 2015). To be able to reply as
effectively as possible, ProSun engaged Price Waterhouse
Coopers (PWC), resulting in a report that was highly crit-
ical of Prognos’ methodology and claimed that anti-
dumping duties would in fact increase local employment,
although, in contrast to the Prognos study, it did not seek to
calculate exact figures (PWC 2013). Although primarily
based on economic analysis, the report also stressed the
wider context, particularly the Chinese government’s five-
year plan, to which ProSun press releases also referred (see
last row in Table 3). A key point was that China’s objec-
tive was not only to develop the solar panel industry, but
the whole value chain (ProSun 2013e). We thus see very
different ‘stories’ emerging from the two camps, which
served to underscore their relative positions (Fine and
Sandstrom 1993).
Further economic arguments marshalled by ProSun
included the accusation that Chinese producers were
striving for a monopoly position on the EU market and,
once that had been realised, innovation would cease and
prices would go up again. Although there is evidence that
R&D spending in Germany fell as difficulties in the sector
increased (Blau 2013), this argument sits uneasily with
recent academic studies of the PV sector in China. They
indicate that firms in this sector have developed quite
unique innovation capabilities precisely through exploiting
their international customer and supplier links, such that
they are just as reliant on their international partners,
including those in Germany, as the latter are on them
(Nahm and Steinfeld 2014; Quitzow 2015). AFASE saw
such complaints by European firms (and ProSun) as illus-
trating the fact that they were not able to face competition
and therefore were ideologically biased in favour of pro-
tectionism, not free trade.
The nature of the product in question also provided the
opportunity to mobilise wider environmental arguments.
Through its website and position papers, AFASE often
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referred to the potential negative impacts of anti-dumping
duties on the uptake of solar power in Europe. A salient,
related aspect in this regard, included in Table 3, concerns
the reduction in panel prices resulting from Chinese
imports. AFASE emphasised the positive effects of lower
prices, for Europe in general and for consumers and sus-
tainability in particular, as it would promote the spread of
renewables: ‘‘The increased use of solar energy hinges on
solar energy being competitive with other sources of
energy… The imposition of anti-dumping measures is
blatantly inconsistent with this goal’’ (AFASE 2012a).
ProSun developed a circuitous argument to justify how
low prices were bad for the environment. It invoked the
risk that high uptake of solar would increase pressure on
subsidy systems to such an extent that political support for
schemes would collapse. A ProSun (2013e) press release
accused Chinese producers of undermining EU support
systems for green energy by providing too much low-cost
supply: ‘‘China flooded the European solar market with
dumped modules, overburdening European support
schemes’’. AFASE (2013f), however, countered that the
phasing out of support schemes is inevitable and has
nothing to do with cheap imports: ‘‘If some EU manufac-
turers of solar products have been complacent and expected
public support schemes to stay in place for a long time and
to keep prices for solar products and profitability high, they
should blame themselves’’.
The arguments in the case were picked up by environ-
mental campaigners. A group of NGOs, headed by WWF,
issued a position paper in May 2013 in which they strongly
opposed anti-dumping duties on Chinese imports. They
highlighted the negative employment effects forecast in the
Prognos report, but also the impact on the EU’s long term
environmental goals: ‘‘This move by the Commission
[proposing interim duties] questions the continued pathway
to a clean and renewable energy economy in Europe’’
(WWF 2013). Moreover, they questioned the argument that
Chinese solar production was only for export and that
China itself was not acting on global warming: ‘‘Fact [sic]
is that China has one of the most ambitious targets for
domestic PV installations’’. By linking the outcome of the
case to the negative implications for both EU employees
and the environment, the NGO statement underlined the
fact that the interests of the EU at large would not be best
served by restricting imports. This provides an alternative
ideological framing to that proposed by the supporters of
duties i.e. it stresses global public goods and the need to put
environmental objectives before economics (Fine and
Sandstrom 1993; Garmann 2014).
AFASE referred to the WWF report in a press release
(see Table 3) as an unsolicited external party’s view that
strengthened their position. ProSun, on the other hand, was
scathing about the involvement of NGOs in the case. In an
interview, the spokesperson stated they had fundamentally
misunderstood the threat from the Chinese PV industry and
had, in effect, been misled by AFASE, whose focus on
environmental impacts obscured wider political and eco-
nomic goals. Remarkably, the campaign by NGOs and
others solicited a Commission riposte early in the investi-
gation stating that ‘‘… a market that faces dumped imports
will drive local producers out of business and could dis-
courage EU producers from developing cutting edge
technologies in the renewable energy sector’’ (CEC 2012c).
Such a spontaneous defence of the anti-dumping system is
unusual and underlines the pressure felt and the importance
of the issue.
Discussion
As the preceding analysis has shown, faced with the
challenge posed by the solar panel case, the targeted Chi-
nese MNEs responded in different ways. We found evi-
dence of some of the strategies identified in existing
literature which emerged from the study of deep presence
through FDI, usually by developed-country MNEs. Some-
times the EMNEs in our study tailored their actions to the
specific situation. Furthermore, rather novel approaches
seemed to be at play, perhaps due to the ideological nature
of criticisms and to the EMNEs’ LOR. Table 4 presents an
overview of the different strategies that emerged from both
sides of the debate, the tactics and actions taken to achieve
these strategic objectives and an indication of whether they
(mostly) address LOF and/or LOR.
The solar panel dispute highlighted liabilities of Chinese
PV exporters related to their newness in the market, per-
ceived lack of legitimacy and trust, concerns about the loss
of EU technological superiority and jobs, and the framing
of these firms as ‘agents’ of a foreign state, acting in
concert with the governments’ five-year plan. This latter
point was a key element in their LOR, augmented by the
legal reality of NME for China and Chinese MNEs. The
overall objective of the EMNEs’ strategies in this case
included strengthening localisation and ‘embeddedness’, as
identified in previous work (Daamen et al. 2007). Tactics
included the acquisition of expertise to reduce unfamil-
iarity, exemplifying the ‘buying-in’ of required resources
to reduce LOF (and LOR) (Daamen et al. 2007), as well as
the creation of networks with European firms and stake-
holders and the gradual favouring of these partners in
media presentations.
Both AFASE as a group and the Chinese MNEs were
active in promoting their key messages (see Table 4). In
terms of LOR, the Chinese firms were more active, as
could be expected from the peculiarities of their situation.
While AFASE lobbied on the basis of ‘community
A. Kolk, L. Curran
123
interest’, the Chinese MNEs sought to showcase their
familiarity by distancing themselves from their home
government and underlining their credentials as private
companies established by individual visionaries unrelated
to the state apparatus—i.e., ‘normal’ capitalist companies
listed on the stock exchange. In a similar vein, they also
stressed the international nature of the sector and how
difficult it was to put a nationality on a product. Their
rhetoric reflected free market ideology and emphasised the
benefits of globalisation. This point was echoed in AFA-
SE’s position papers and especially in the Prognos report,
with its emphasis on the symbiosis between cheap panels
and job creation in the EU solar sector.
Some of the strategies adopted in this dispute are rather
novel, especially the strengthening of local embeddedness
through the creation of the ad-hoc group (AFASE).
Although conceptually anticipated by Eden and Miller
(2009) and McGuire et al. (2012), actual cross-regional




Establish material harm to the
EU
Provide specific indications of lost EU jobs and innovation LOF and
LOR
ProSun
Sponsor ‘objective’ empirical analysis LOF ProSun
Highlight threat to EU energy security LOR ProSun
Marshal ‘China Threat’ fears Undermine legitimacy of Chinese market actors; ‘shady middlemen’ LOR ProSun
Conflate Chinese companies with the state; ‘Chinese dumping’ LOR ProSun
Highlight Chinese involvement in AFASE, a ‘front group’, as indicative of a
lack of legitimacy
LOR ProSun
Use political and legal
avenues to secure
protection
File complaint to the European Commission and lobby for political support LOF and
LOR
ProSun
Appeal against the minimum price undertaking LOF and
LOR
ProSun
Provide regular details of alleged breaching of the undertaking to the
Commission and issue press releases accusing Chinese government and





economic effects of duties
Provide detailed estimates of supposed job losses in the event that duties were
imposed
LOF AFASE

















Acquire local knowledge (e.g. PR companies, lawyers) LOF Chinese
MNEs




Prioritise use of local spokespeople LOF and
LOR
AFASE
Reduce number of Chinese member firms; increase EU membership LOR AFASE
Showcase familiarity Emphasise private status of companies (i.e. listed on stock exchange, not
related to state apparatus)
LOR Chinese
MNEs





Harness policy relations Negotiate agreement with European Commission LOF Chinese
MNEs
Take retaliatory anti-dumping action LOF Chinese
government
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lobbying initiatives are rare. The AFASE website provided
a very sophisticated lobbying platform, including model
letters to decision-makers, training on the issue for firms
and detailed argumentation challenging the anti-dumping
case. Strategically it clearly represented an attempt by
Chinese companies to increase their legitimacy by locali-
sation of lobbying activities as they sought to become
‘insiders’ (Eden and Miller 2009), and link their interests to
those of host-country actors. It is also an example of
institutional entrepreneurship in reaction to LOR (Ra-
machandran and Pant 2010), as the Chinese firms that
initially launched AFASE were quite successful in estab-
lishing a wide consortium covering all EU member states.
Interestingly, we also found that they changed their strat-
egy over time in view of the perceived foreignness of the
founding membership, which resulted in LOF, or, in
AFASE’s case, LOR. Thus, achieving a local embedded-
ness required a localisation of the alliance.
This was particularly mirrored in the presentation and
composition of AFASE’s membership, as discussed in the
findings section. In an interview in November 2013, a
representative conceded that once a wide selection of EU
companies had been mobilised in the organisation ‘‘… we
felt it was much better to go as 100 % branded Euro-
peans…’’, and also admitted that Chinese involvement
‘‘…wasn’t a huge barrier, but it wasn’t helping us’’. The
change thus seemed to be a direct reaction to criticisms
from ProSun, which constantly drew attention to the
involvement of Chinese firms, in order to marshal fears of a
‘China threat’. Thus, in spite of already having a wide
membership, the AFASE group was politically disadvan-
taged by the involvement of ‘foreign’ companies in its
grouping. Specifically its Chinese members were repre-
sented as ideologically suspect, reflecting LOR. Even after
the public changes in membership and home-country
affiliation, ProSun continued (2013c) to use the ‘front
group’ label whenever possible, referring to ‘‘…the Chi-
nese-backed lobbying group AFASE’’ (see Table 4).
The link made between the imposition of anti-dumping
duties on cheap solar panels on the one hand and the EU’s
sustainability objectives and the related broader ‘public
good’ on the other is also notable. Local environmental
NGOs mobilised in support of the Chinese exporters in this
regard, helping to marshal fears that duties would have a
negative effect on environmental objectives. The joint
statement of several well-respected NGOs, includingWWF,
against the duties, provided a level of legitimacy to AFA-
SE’s perspective that its own PR machinery could not
achieve. The NGO involvement embodied the use of
‘stakeholder support resources’ (Dahan 2005), providing
wider legitimacy for AFASE’s objectives and representing
an enhancement of reputation and reliability in the local
setting (Klossek et al. 2012). The fact that the arguments
were made by NGOs, rather than the interested firms, gave
them added weight. It also signalled that the Chinese MNEs
were contributing to wider societal goals, which enabled
them to appear more socially responsible than their detrac-
tors. This was important to them, since, as outlined above,
Chinese MNEs often face challenges abroad in relation to
CSR (Kolk 2010b). Furthermore, themove tomerge AFASE
into SETI was not an arbitrary choice. SETI (2014, 2015)
continues to provide updates and press releases on the case,
including updates on the minimum-price undertaking and of
progress on ProSun’s call for investigation of alleged con-
travention (see Table 2). SETI and its host institution ICTSD
are funded, inter alia, by governments (including Norway
and the UK) and multilateral institutions (including WTO
and UNEP), which renders them less ideologically suspect
than private lobby groups.
Finally, in addition to the relatively sophisticated strate-
gies of the Chinese firms within their host region, there is
also evidence that they harnessed their political contacts.
Although Chinese exporters faced liabilities because of their
origin, this fact also strengthened their situation. Their home
government was important from the beginning, as early
press reports refer to veiled threats of retaliation from Chi-
nese officials (Chaffin and Wiesmann 2012) and actual
retaliation was forthcoming in the form of an anti-dumping
case against polysilicon, which especially affected German
business (Lewis 2014). Once the decision to impose provi-
sional anti-dumping duties was taken, diplomatic activity by
China seemed to increase further, with observers indicating
that member states were pressured to reject the proposal,
putting the Commission on the defensive (Chaffin 2013; De
Gruyter 2014; Evenett 2013). A Chinese spokesman for-
mally denied this in a press conference, stating that member
states’ positions were simply based on common sense
(ChineseMission 2013). Still, it is undeniable that the launch
of a retaliatory anti-dumping investigation against EU wine
and the apparent threat of a new case against German cars
had an effect on EU governments (Chaffin 2013). Moreover,
it drew in a new set of EU actors with a vested interest in an
amicable settlement, who themselves helped to marshal
fears on the potential negative impacts of duties on the EU
economy. For example, the head of the French wine expor-
ters association acknowledged in a press interview that he
had lobbied Frenchministries against the solar anti-dumping
duties (Compadre 2013).
Conclusions
This paper has explored the role of ideology in attempts to
influence public policy and in business representation in
the EU–China solar panel dispute. Our analysis of the
evolution of this specific issue illustrates the complexities
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involved in the interaction between markets and ideologies
in the midst of debates regarding different types of subsidy
regimes for renewables, free trade versus protectionist
tendencies by governments and sustainability objectives.
We also examined the dynamics of the international
activity of these Chinese MNEs in the EU, epitomising
emerging-market versus developed-country tensions. This
has shed light on the recent notion of ‘liability of origin’, in
addition to the traditional concept of ‘liability of foreign-
ness’ studied in international business research, in relation
to firms’ market and political strategies, and their institu-
tional embeddedness in home and host countries.
The EMNEs were confronted with institutional frictions,
including societal expectations and actor dynamics that
diverged between their home and host contexts, which
went beyond the ‘‘ethics away from home’’ dilemmas
already discussed in the literature. In this case, public
accusations about illegal practices, blackmailing, trickery
and front groups were added to more traditional econom-
ically grounded concerns about the ‘‘destruction’’ of
European jobs, factories and technologies, and sustain-
ability considerations (see Table 3). ProSun portrayed the
priorities of the Chinese governments and the exporting
companies as one, highlighting a key difficulty mentioned
by McGuire et al. (2012, p. 348) for EMNEs as being
‘‘…seen as essentially agents of government rather than
commercial operations’’. This harnessing of rhetoric rep-
resentative of a ‘China threat’ ideology resonated with
media and academic concerns about the risk of the rise of
China being accompanied by increasing strength of Chi-
nese values on the global stage (Halper 2010, 2011).
The Chinese MNEs and AFASE, which supported their
cause, adopted a range of strategies and tactics to counter
their LOF and LOR, in reaction to ProSun (see Table 4).
They became active participants in the public debate to
defend their interests against a direct threat from the host
region’s institutions, marshalling diverse arguments and a
range of local stakeholders in support of their case. While
the institutional friction between home and host contexts
directly impacted the Chinese firms involved, the combi-
nation of their strategies and support from the domestic
government ensured an acceptable outcome. Their lobby-
ing campaign was sophisticated and multi-level, using a
variety of approaches which have been identified in the
literature on corporate political activity, including buying
in expertise, mobilising relational and organisational
resources, and securing stakeholder support (Dahan 2005).
Ideology played a role throughout the period covered by
our study, but was most intense in the phase after the
imposition of provisional duties and ProSun (2015) con-
tinues to use ideological arguments for action.
The manner in which the solar panel case evolved and the
rhetoric around it have implications for theorising about how
different types of liabilities influence MNEs in general, and
EMNEs in particular. The Chinese MNEs sought to
strengthen their local embeddedness in various ways,
through buying-in of local expertise and attempts to inte-
grate into local networks. Our findings thus provide evidence
of the hypothesis formulated by McGuire et al. (2012) that
coalitions of interest will develop when EMNEs’ interests
become aligned with those of local firms. It also shows that
cross-country industry associationsmay help ChineseMNEs
to be seen as insiders, as proposed by Eden and Miller
(2009). Despite the novelty and relative success of collab-
oration with European firms and, notably, with NGOs, it
should be noted that the efforts of Chinese MNEs to be seen
as ‘insiders’ failed to some extent. The Chinese firms that
initially mobilised ad-hoc resistance to the anti-dumping
duties were replaced over time by representatives of local
European companies. This rather extreme ‘localisation’ of
the alliance, which finally saw all Chinese firms disappear
from the membership listing, seems likely to be tied to the
very specific difficulties they faced, linked to ProSun’s
tendency to conflate them with their home government.
It is thus not LOF but LOR that dominated in this
context, as Chinese firms were more vulnerable in the EU
not just because they were foreign, but because of their
Chinese nationality. State ownership was not an issue, as
the two largest firms—Trina Solar and Yingli—were pri-
vate. However, the differences inherent in the economic
model of their home country meant that these EMNEs were
subject to greater discrimination hazards, including nega-
tive stereotyping, than other foreign firms (Eden and Miller
2009). The active role of the Chinese government in the
economy was used by those who supported the duties to
undermine the legitimacy of Chinese MNEs, in line with
the ‘China threat’ ideology (see Table 3) in a rather similar
manner to the way OPEC producers were painted as
‘unethical’ in the campaign to rebrand tar sand oil as
‘ethical’ (Haase and Raufflet 2012). In the end, however,
the strong state also provided a context of active support
for a negotiated ‘amicable’ settlement, and press reports
and interviews with key actors indicate that the final out-
come of the case was indeed impacted by the Chinese
government. This active involvement of the home gov-
ernment was suggested as a necessary component for
countering LOR (Ramachandran and Pant 2010) given that
it is a country-related concept, and not firm-specific. Firm
action alone would probably have been insufficient to
adequately address the issue.
Although in this case the outcome was relatively
favourable to the EMNEs, which in effect acted as insti-
tutional entrepreneurs (Ramachandran and Pant 2010), in
general, LOR seems more difficult to address than certain
types of LOF, such as unfamiliarity, which can be
addressed through learning (Petersen and Pedersen 2002).
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Some discrimination in host settings may be generic to all
foreign firms, but those from countries of origin with very
different governance and institutions to the host country are
likely to face specific barriers linked to ideological dif-
ferences. The frequent highlighting of these differences by
the local firms seeking protection in this case illustrates the
enduring power of ‘stories’ to transmit values and underpin
ideology (Wines and Hamilton 2009). At the same time,
the Chinese firms presented their own ‘stories’ of entre-
preneurial visionaries seeking to save the planet through
free, fair and global competition. In this case, ideology can
be viewed as ‘‘meaning in the service of power’’ (Chelli
and Gendron 2013, p. 190), with both sides trying to use it
to legitimise their positions and define what is ‘normal’.
This study has helped to shed more light on these issues
and the dynamics at play. China is amongst the most
prominent emerging economies, and its economic and
political importance means it is an illustrative case. At the
same time, follow-up research, covering other cases, sec-
tors and countries, would be helpful, as there were aspects
that seemed peculiar to the ‘Chineseness’ of the MNEs
involved and to solar panels. It should also be noted that
dumping cases are typically highly sensitive, which
imposed constraints on our ability to disclose interviewee
names and to interview government representatives. While
we could use reported positions in the press, seen as a
reliable source in these cases (Evenett and Vermulst 2005),
and a range of other sources, including interview data from
both sides of the dispute, additional primary information
might have had added value. Overall, however, while
remaining modest in terms of our study’s potential appli-
cability beyond Chinese MNEs, we believe that the in-
depth investigation can inform our existing understanding
of MNE strategy and the interactions between markets and
ideologies, and provide useful building blocks for theory.
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